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As this edition of Undercurrents is poised to print, an online CBC article
reports the top ten things visitors will not see in Beijing during the
Olympic Games.  The government is in the midst of a crackdown to manufacture what they believe is a more
acceptable China, or perhaps more precisely, a more acceptable China to Western eyes.  Number one is rain.1 After
“rowdy fans” and “pushing and shoving” is “dog meat.”  Not only will dog meat not appear on restaurant menus,
but regular patrons will also be actively discouraged from ordering any canine-related cuisine during the Games.  
Of the CBC list, the dog meat entry has prompted the greatest deluge of website feedback.  A brief sampling: “Say
what you will about culture, I still don’t like the idea of dogs for food. At least in North America, our animals are
killed somewhat humanely…”; “It is ridiculous for us to judge the Chinese harshly for eating dogs as food when we
slaughter thousands of animals every year to fill our bellies in North America”; “People rarely eat dog here. It is
actually a Korean thing”; “As for dog... a little gamey but delicious! Don’t knock it ‘til you’ve tried it!” and finally,
“Ace work fact-checking, CBC - that [accompanying] photo of [the] ‘dog meat’ [protest] was taken in Korea.” 
There are many important queries to pose about the CBC story, featured picture, and resultant commentary.  We
might immediately raise questions related to nationalism, colonialism, xenophobia, food politics, racism, technol-
ogy, spectatorship, and animal welfare, among others.  Perhaps the more challenging exercise is to consider how
these discourses might intersect in complex and layered ways.  Even that is not enough, though, as the discourses
we use to analyze phenomena are rife with their own suppositions.  For example, how does one become a food ani-
mal?  In which ways do dominant discourses of nationalism preclude the possibility of animal nations?  How does
“animal welfare” assume the property status of animals and an orientation toward “humane” care rather than
industry abolition?  In the Academy and society more broadly, we are learning to ask better questions, to question
the discourses themselves, and to call out the unmarked categories as the tenuous and contradictory constructions
they are.  
Chief among these pursuits for Animal Studies scholars are efforts to de-center the human subject (e.g., Baker,
1993), that is, to both reveal the human subject as a historically and culturally-mediated construction, and to
simultaneously reposition animals as subjects.  For many, such a shift is paired with the desire to realize what
Sallie McFague (1997) describes as "subject-subjects relations." In her article, "Becoming (more-than) human,
Nicole Bonner addresses this notion as part of her inquiry into the the colonial and gendered roots of the concept
of "human," suggesting that a continual interrogation of how we understand that category opens up a more ethi-
cal position from which to act.   In relation, a great deal is missed (and many negative consequences reaped) when
our analyses fail to acknowledge animals beyond their metaphorical uses, or when we treat them simply as blank
canvasses to splash own desires and fears against  These are not minor topics.  As Jody Emel and Jennifer Wolch
(1998) contend, “As the frontier between civility and barbarity, culture and nature increasingly drifts, animal bod-
ies flank the moving line.  It is upon animal bodies that the struggles for naming what is human, what lies within
the grasp of human agency, what is possible are taking place” (p. 19).  Consider, for example, Akira Mizuta Lippit’s
contention (this issue) that Western human subjectivity is, as of the late 1950s, haunted subjectivity.  That is, the
human subject is haunted by animals and all excluded Others.  The self-assuring phrase, “It’s only an animal,” does
not hold.  Animals return our gaze; they assert their presence and their subjectivity.
Following Donna Haraway (1991, 2003), an appreciation of specificity and partial perspective is crucial.  As more
critical understandings of dominant Western human subjectivity are generated, there must be a simultaneous
acknowledgement of the multiplicity of subjectivities and cultures, both human and nonhuman, which are repro-
duced and negotiated in particular places, at particular times.  For example, Gavan Watson shows this in his atten-
tion to the interlaced multiple meanings of “the Barn Owl”, specifically as related to a controversial photo that
appeared in an Ontario birding community one fated winter.  Adjacently, Rachel Forbes, in her investigation of
the possible place of animals within Aboriginal legal systems, contrasts such renderings against those of tradition-
al Western jurisprudence.  Without such engaged orientation, we are prone to regard Others as abstractions, com-
fortable in the false sense of security that these categories can afford; we potentially elide meaningful differences
and remain starkly ignorant of past and present lived experiences, while leaving ourselves largely unmoved and
unchanged.
This issue of Undercurrents is an invitation.  Like the featured photography of Jo-Anne McArthur, which draws us
deeper into its subjects, these pieces offer entry points into future discussions.   In these offerings, UnderCurrents
invites readers to open more spaces where “the question of the animal”, and its various human and nonhuman
interlocutors, may flourish. 
Guest Editorial
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Contents:
3.
5.
6.
11. 
12.
13.
17.
18.
20.
23.
26.
28.
36.
38.
39.
4 UnderCurrents  vol. 17
Animal - An introduction
Lauren Corman
Elephant and River Street 
Sue Lloyd
Hinterland's Who’s Who: Birding, Multiplicity, and Barn Owls
Gavan P.L.Watson
Photography by
Jo-Anne McArthur
Becoming (More-than-) Human:
Nicole Bonner
Illustrations
Sami Abdelmalik
Photos
Jo-Anne McArthur
You are my Sunshine
Mara Steinberg
Electric Animal: An interview with Akira Mizuta Lippit 
Lauren Corman
Photos
Jo-Anne McArthur
Untitled
Jackson Tait
Creating Legal Space for Animal-Indigenous Relationships
Rachel Forbes
Photos 
Jo-Anne McArthur
Review: Making a Killing 
Liz Hartnet
Contributors
5UnderCurrents vol. 17
Elephant and River Street, Photomontage by Sue Lloyd  
6 UnderCurrents  vol. 17
The Barn Owl
The Barn Owl (Tyto alba) is a medium-sized, tawny
coloured owl that, with the exception of Antarctica, has
worldwide distribution. Like most owls the Barn Owl is
considered to be nocturnal. Like all owls, it is predatory
bird. In the Barn Owl’s case, members of the species are
said to enjoy (or specialize, in the biological parlance) in
small ground mammals—rodents, for example. In
Eastern North America, the majority of their diet would
include Meadow Voles (Microtus pennsylvanicus) and
Deer Mice (Peromyscus maniculatus). Barn Owls strike
a distinct-look with their lack of ear tufts (a misnomer
of sorts as the tufts—the “horns” of a Great Horned Owl,
Bubo virginianus—are not ears and not associated with
hearing at all) and their distinct heart-shaped facial disc
(which is associated with hearing, but that’s another
story for another time). As their common name sug-
gests they can be found living in barns, on a nest made
from the regurgitated un-digestible remains of those
Meadow Voles and Deer Mice they hunt. Of course Barn
Owls are not just limited to barns, but nest in silos,
abandoned buildings and tree cavities too. Arguably,
this should make their name “Barn, Silo, Abandoned
Building & Tree Cavity Owl” but that doesn’t really roll
off the tongue in the same way.
These attributes and distinguishing features are all
things to keep in mind if you find yourself out bird-
watching near a barn in Southern Ontario. During your
explorations, while there are certain to be Rock Pigeons
(Columba livia) fluttering about, if you happen to come
across a Barn Owl in this setting, you should take
notice. Seeing a Barn Owl in Southern Ontario (espe-
cially a living Barn Owl) is something to make special
note of—it’s not a regular occurrence. Part of the signif-
icance of seeing a Barn Owl lies in its relative in-abun-
dance. While individuals identified as Tyto alba enjoy a
cosmopolitan reputation, Southern Ontario has been
considered the northern range of the species (“Ontario
Barn Own Recovery Project,” 2005) and it has been
suggested that Barn Owls have always found, say, other
places more to their liking. Because of this, the Barn
Owl is a special bird in Canada: it is officially endan-
gered, recognized by the Committee on the Status of
Endangered Wildlife in Canada (COSEWIC) (“Ontario
Barn Own Recovery Project,” 2005). It seems as though
Barn Owls living in Ontario have had bad luck of late—
of the “handful” (“Ontario Barn Own Recovery Project,”
2005 ¶ 4) that have been seen since 1999, two were
roadkills (“Ontario Barn Own Recovery Project,” 2005)
and no breeding pairs have been “confirmed.”
The Barn Owl of February 27th 2006
If you are a serious birder in Ontario, with a
computer and internet access, it is likely that you are
aware of the electronic mailing list called Ontbirds.
Ontbirds is presented by the self-proclaimed provincial
birding association, the Ontario Field Ornithologists.
The electronic mailing list (or listserv) is meant to be a
clearing-house of bird sightings and directions for
interested birders: you read about a bird you would like
to see, get the directions and off you go on a (perhaps
literal) wild goose chase. On average, four to seven
sightings are posted daily. As might be expected, more
posting occurs on the weekend, and more postings
occur seasonally during spring and fall migration.
Typical emails follow a standard form: the subject line
contains the bird or birds seen and their location while
the body of the email contains more specific informa-
tion about the birds and precise directions to the loca-
tion they might be found. While thorough, the informa-
tion shared is, generally speaking, pretty uncontentious
stuff. So, it was with interest that a seemingly normal
post on February 28th, 2006 took on new dimensions:
whispers of deception, accusation of fraud and, more
interestingly for my work, questions of what is normal,
known and natural all emerged.
On February 28th, 2006, a simple posting appeared in
mailboxes of subscribers outlining how a photograph
had been taken of a Barn Owl and posted on a web-
based photography site. A URL was given linking to the
photograph. It was noted that the photographer had not
reported seeing the bird on the Ontbirds listserv, but
that there was a link to the location where the bird was
seen. That same day, the moderator of the listserv post-
ed reminding the subscribers that the Barn Owl was
considered “endangered” on breeding territory and that
there were rules about posting about endangered birds
on the listserv; all of the requirements that needed to be
met prior to posting were created in order to reduce the
likelihood that an observed bird would abandon a nest
or breeding attempt.
The following day, March 1st, a conversation had begun
Hinterland's Who’s Who:
Birding, Multiplicity, and Barn Owls
Gavan P.L. Watson
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via the listserv. Another respondent was interested in
knowing more details about the sighting and if the bird
had been seen again. The next email later that day was
from the photographer himself. In the email, he
explained that though he did not remember exactly
where he saw the bird, he used Google maps to locate
the general location and road names. According to his
directions, the Barn Owl was seen in Eastern Ontario,
in the Ottawa region. As well, he shared the story of
finding the owl, taking the photograph and watching
the bird fly away from him. The author also stated that
his initial reason for going out birding that day was to
find Snowy Owls to photograph and that he had no luck
in finding those birds that day.
On March 2nd, another email arrived from another
Ontbirds subscriber. In it, the author began to question
the authenticity of the photograph. This email suggest-
ed that the owl’s feet have been “doctored,” as though
something was removed after the photograph had been
taken. The author reminded those reading that the Barn
Owl is rare for Ontario and especially so where the pho-
tograph was taken—the implication being that the bird
is so rare that it most likely didn’t exist.
A third email followed on March 2nd in which the
author suggests that there is nothing in the photograph
that appears unusual or doctored. The author offered
another suggestion about the authenticity of the owl.
He reminded us that there was a Barn Owl sighting in a
different part of Ontario earlier in the winter and attrib-
utes the owl’s presence not to digital photographic
magic, but to efforts undertaken on the part of humans
to help the species recover.
Yet, this claim to reality does not seem to be working.
Later in the afternoon on March 2nd, a fourth email
arrived that supports the initial hypothesis that the
photograph has been doctored. The author shared that
the bird looks like one he had seen at Parc Omega, a
wildlife park in Québec, and provides a URL to a photo-
graph of the Parc Omega Barn Owl.
The pull of the network to make the photograph unau-
thentic, and in turn, the owl, continues to mount. In a
fifth email, the author shared the contention that the
fencepost the Barn Owl is pictured perching on was spe-
cially made for captive birds to land on. The author also
suggested that given the lighting of the photograph and
kind of weather that was observed on the day that the
photograph was supposed to have been taken, the pho-
tograph could not be discounted as being genuine.
This is where the conversation ends on Ontbirds. At
5:30 pm on March 2nd, the listserv co-ordinator posted
a message that states that the current conversation on
the photographed Barn Owl is inappropriate. The co-
ordinator reminded readers that Ontbirds is not a dis-
cussion list and is for “reporting birds period.” The clos-
ing line in the email reminds readers that not following
the guidelines could result in the restriction or loss of
being able to post to the listerv.
This does not mean, however, that the conversation
ended. In following the network thread to a website that
catalogues rare birds from the Ottawa area, the sighting
details for the Barn Owl seen on February 27th is pref-
aced with the words “LIKELY HOAX.” The page author
outlines a litany of evidence that supports his claim that
the image has been manipulated. The webpage author
concludes his outline with the statement “let the viewer
beware.”
Enacting birds: reflection on the Barn Owl of
February 27th
I have spent some time thinking about the birders and
the Barn Owl. I have read and reflected on the emails
and the allegations. From this, themes have emerged
concerning the construction of what is natural as well
as insights into the creation of what Donna Haraway
(2003) calls "naturecultures." Most importantly, this
event, be it framed as authentic bird sighting or elabo-
rate hoax, helps enact and make visible a topology of
inter-species ethical relations between those who
watch birds and the birds they watch. 
this event, be it framed as authentic bird sighting or elaborate hoax helps enact and make visi-
ble a topology of inter-species ethical relations between those who watch birds and the birds
they watch. 
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Networks
Ontbirds operates within an established network of
relations. People post their sightings to share with
other interested birders. The process through which
experiences are transcribed from embodied encoun-
ters to textual references is seemingly an invisible one.
In this case, there were visible deviations from the
established network. Within the birding community
that posts to Ontbirds, the claim to have "found" a bird
is an important one. In posts where the author is
reporting a first-sighting and they did not find the bird
themselves, the name of the bird finder (skilled, lucky
or otherwise, as it is never suggested the kind of effort
it took to come across the bird) is included. In this
example, the finder did not make a submission to
Ontbirds to report a rare bird. Rather, it seems like in
this case, the original post came via an on-line gallery
created by the finder that had the photograph and
birding information on it. While never overtly stated, I
believe that the authenticity of the Barn Owl was par-
tially called into question due to the fact that the find-
er of the bird did not post his sighting to the listserv. 
Additionally, I find interesting to note that in the find-
er's one email to the Ontbirds listserv, he did his best
to fit into the established network. However, problem-
atic for him, he was not familiar with the area where
he took the photograph. Part of the established
Ontbirds network is knowing where you observed a
bird; the more detailed the description of location and
directions, the better.
In networks, effort is required to maintain the rela-
tionships of the actors. The listserv tends to operate
with little of what I would call boundary policing on
the part of the co-ordinator. What is particularly inter-
esting about the Barn Owl postings was the need of the
Ontbirds co-ordinator to make comments concerning
the type and quality of postings over the three day
period, all referencing the mail about the Barn Owl. In
well-established networks, subtle deviations from the
established routine lead to powerful reactions: net-
works tend to become visible when they are threat-
ened. The questioning of the authenticity seems to be
such a reaction.
What this suggests for a birding network is the power
that lies in the focus on names, dates and details. This
hybridity that exists between birders and the electron-
ic mailing list certainly has implications in shaping
what is considered normal, known and natural for
those who subscribe to the list. Birds are enacted
Figure 1: Set of relations enacted in this Barn Owl sighting
through Ontbirds as realities "out there" to be discov-
ered, recorded and reported. While this is not neces-
sarily that surprising, it does, in turn have an impact
on other enactments of birds, especially visible in the
multiple objects created.
Multiple objects
In this case there was an exceeding focus by birders on
the rarity of the bird, to the point where I believe that
the Barn Owl became a multiple object. Emerging
from the field of Science and Technology studies, the
idea of multiple objects opens a different way to think
about the taken-for-granted: objects are often thought
of as rigid and immobile in their existence - a Barn
Owl will always be a Barn Owl (for a detailed discus-
sion of multiple objects, see Law, 2004; Mol, 2002). In
response to this, a multiple version of the object coun-
ters this notion of singularity. In focusing on the frac-
tal nature of "reality" and in attending to difference, I
believe that this perspective requires attention be paid
to the enactment of objects. Enactment, in this sense,
is the claim that "relations, and so realities and repre-
sentations of realities...are being endlessly or chroni-
cally brought into being in a continuing process of pro-
duction and reproduction, and have no status, stand-
ing or reality outside those processes" (Law, 2004, p.
159). Enactment is different than constructivism as it
does not "imply convergence to singularity," in opposi-
tion to the fixing of objects' identities, "but takes dif-
ference and multiplicity to be chronic conditions"
(Law, 2004, p. 158). Difference suggests that multiple
versions of the same object can exist simultaneously-
this occurs because while objects are enacted in prac-
tice, these practices can be different. If the practices
are different, then so too must be the objects (Law,
2004). Yet these multiple versions-or multiple objects-
are, more often than not, able to cohere together. So, if
these coherences shape our reality, then reality: 
is not in principal fixed or singular, and truth is
no longer the only ground for accepting or
rejecting a representation. The implication is
that there are various possible reasons, includ-
ing the political, for enacting one kind of reality
rather than another, and that these grounds
can in some measure be debated. (Law, 2004,
p. 162)
As such, a focus on the enactment of objects is filled
with attention to the many ways that actors, human
and otherwise, engage to create a reality: a reality
described through investigation, a reality that is not
the only one "out there" and a reality that focuses on
heterogeneity and difference. In the move to collapse
multiple realities into one, a distinctly political move is
made, where one reality, one particular enactment of
an object gains primacy over the others. In this partic-
ular becoming of the Barn Owl, the enactment of rarity
overshadowed the other ways the bird was known (see
Figure 1). Rather than having to pass judgement on if I
think the Barn Owl was properly enacted, I think it is
more valuable to examine the ways the bird was enact-
ed. Let me outline the different ways (that I can see):
- as a rare bird species (through the Ontbirds
coordinator, external web pages and some bird-
ers' previous knowledge)
- as a biological reality (through the email that
suggested the Owl was a result of species
rebound and human conservation efforts)
- as digital magic (many of the claims to digital
alteration of the photograph enacted this Barn
Owl)
- as an Eastern Ontario Barn Owl (through the
initial posting)
- as an Québec Barn Owl (through the claims it
came from Parc Omega)
There have also been subtle and tacit ways that the
authenticity has been enacted, framed through the
network of discovery, recording and reporting previ-
ously described. Through these discourses, the Barn
Owl has been enacted as a:
- valuable, wild bird
- feral bird of ambivalent worth
- wildlife park captive and therefore does not
count
In this multiplicity, the Barn Owl lost value in the eyes
of some birders as its authenticity was called into
question. What is implicit in this questioning is the
understanding that there is some kind of a continuum
that reported birds are judged against. It seems that
the gold standard of authenticity is one that is wild,
rare and (relatively) easy to find. It goes without say-
ing that this perspective is not entirely unproblematic.
This, in part, helps explain why there are not any post-
ings to Ontbirds describing a flock of Pigeons seen in a
ubiquitous habitat, such as the urbanized core of
Anytown, Ontario. A Pigeon simply does not match up
to the gold standard of valuable birds. In deciding
what gets to "count" in knowledge-making endeav-
ours, and what counts as the gold standard, other
birds disappear from what is noticed. In that disap-
pearance, the bird moves to the hinterland. I turn to
that next.
The hinterland and otherness
Hinterland's are an attempt to engage with the act of
disappearing. Law puts forward three kinds of
Hinterland's: the first, he suggest are "in-here objects"
(Law, 2004, p. 55); the second are "visible or relevant
out-there contexts" (Law, 2004, p. 55); and the third
are "out-there processes, contexts, and all the rest, that
are both necessary and necessarily disappear from visi-
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bility or relevance" (Law, 2004, p. 55). I would deploy
an artistic metaphor of positive space and negative
space here: that which is present is the positive space of
an image and that which is absent is negative space of
an image. It is often difficult to decide if it is the nega-
tive or positive space that bounds the image: each side
depends on the other such that if one is not there, the
known image would disappear. Perhaps, if I expand the
metaphor, the hidden absent is that which is not within
the frame of the image. Importantly, all that lies outside
the frame, while unnecessary in the composition of the
image, is only unnecessary because it has been selec-
tively ignored in the composition of the image.
Emerging from this perspective on the hinterland is the
acknowledgement that a relationship with the
unknown, or the other, is necessary; rather than simply
ignoring the disappearance, it is an attempt to acknowl-
edge that disappearance is integral to any kind of know-
ing. 
Thus, if birding, as an act, continues the "process [of]
enacting necessary boundaries between presence, man-
ifest absence and Otherness" (Law, 2004, p. 144), then
the various activities taken up in the name of coming to
know these organisms are each a distinctly political
move, moves that shape and reaffirm (mostly conven-
tional) ways of knowing the nonhuman. For example,
the second post in this chain made explicit that the indi-
vidual Barn Owl was, in fact, part of larger species, Tyto
alba and that species was considered to be an endan-
gered one. The term endangered species does just that:
focus on species, at the expense of the individual. In this
organism's identification as a member of a species, it
loses any ability to be something else; what could be has
been othered. This act of othering is at times common
in birdwatching. It occurs more than once in the Barn
Owl discussion: through the questioning about the
validity of the sighting, the focus subtly shifts from the
sighting to determining the authenticity of the photo-
graph. Again, in this move the individual owl disap-
pears.
The Barn Owl was not the only member of the order
Aves to be othered in this particular natureculture
assemblage. It is also interesting to note that the Snowy
Owls, the birds that were the original objective of the
outing that produced the Barn Owl, have disappeared.
Likely, there were other birds seen during that trip, but
for whatever reason (perhaps not rare, not big, not
charismatic), they were ignored. For my purposes, I
consider this othering problematic, in part, because it
does little to acknowledge the lived experiences of non-
human individuals. The challenge here is that the act of
othering, in and of itself, is not inherently wrong. 
Rather than focusing on what might be out there, I
believe that it is important to be able to recognize enact-
ments that are politically aligned with the kind of rela-
tionships that ought to exist. So, one needs to develop
the skill of attending to what is observably cast to the
hinterland and what is brought to the forefront. In a
sense, this is what I've attempted to do with my analy-
sis of the Barn Owl narrative and the creation of the
enacted set of relations in Figure 1. In creating this par-
ticular map of relations, I attempt to move beyond the
established frame and re-focus on those multiple enact-
ments that have been cast aside. In so doing, political
actions and entrenched positions are more easily visi-
ble, while others can re-emerge from obscurity. It is
true that there might be other unknowable enactments
that exist in the hinterland-but let me suggest that
acknowledging that, at best, partial perspectives
(Haraway, 1991) are our best version of reality (as a nod
to multiplicity does) offers more space for other reali-
ties to emerge. 
Thinking more generally about our dominant cultural
relationship with the nonhuman, the promise of atten-
tiveness to the various enactments of animals offer the
opportunity to intentionally enact a reality that is more
in line with one's own ethics. In asking what practices of
birding are good or which practices ought we to be
enacting, attention can be turned to current enactments
to ask: "Ought they be enacted in this way?" This sim-
ple question, paired with the knowledge that there are
other enactments hidden, could be enough to continue
to question some of our Western culture's taken-for-
granted assumptions about what it is to be human and
otherwise.
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In asking what practices of birding are good or which practices ought we to be enacting, atten-
tion can be turned to current enactments and ask: "Ought they be enacted in this way?" 
Keeping non-human animals in captivity is a common practice, fraught with moral complica-
tions and contradictions. In one context, the bent metal of a chain-link fence is a mentally suf-
focating and physically demeaning enclosure, robbing animals of their natural rhythms and
behaviours; in another context, the fence acts as the protective barrier of a sanctuary, guarding
inhabitants from exposure to further brutality at the hands of human beings. The contexts of
captivity are numerous, as are the ways we can rationalize even the most blatant cruelty.
Travelling the world as a photographer, Jo-Anne McArthur has seen and documented the
extremes and in-betweens of human / non-human animal relationships. In the series of photo-
graphs presented throughout this issue of UnderCurrents and on both covers, she explores the
issue of captivity in all of its simplicity and complexity: from roadside "zoos" that dot the
Canadian landscape, to discreet and dense confinement areas where animals are bred for food,
to sanctuaries where comfort and joy abound and eden seems almost within reach.
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In contemporary, North American society, what it
means to be ‘human’ is often taken for granted; in other
words, ‘humanness’ is usually accepted as a readily
knowable, uncomplicated and stable aspect of social
reality. Ivone Gebara argues that because we believe
that we already know the meaning of ‘humanness,’
reflecting on this notion often appears to be of little
interest, need or value. “Since we imagine that everyone
already knows what a [‘human’] is, we might have the
feeling that we are wasting our time on notions that are
already familiar, and that we ought to be seeking solu-
tions to the urgent problems that [currently] face us”
(Gebara, 1999: 67). Like Gebara, I argue that the con-
cept of ‘human,’ is not ‘natural,’ stable or straightfor-
ward, rather it is a culturally-specific and historical
invention, one intimately implicated within contempo-
rary, environmental problems. In other words,
although the category of human is often understood as
readily comprehensible and fundamentally elevated
above, and detached from, nature and ‘more-than-
human’i beings, I maintain that the human subject is
positioned within what I will term ‘the web of life,’ that
is, the worldwide, ecological community which encom-
passes both human and more-than-human subjects. I
believe the term, ‘becoming’ is a useful adjective to
describe the human; becoming allows us to consider the
human not as a natural or stable entity, but as one
which is emerging and transforming in relation to envi-
ronmental and social contexts. As a being situated with-
in an ecological web of life, the human is not distinct
from nature and more-than-human animals, but exists
and changes in continuous relation to them.
Long before the onset of European colonization of
what is now considered North America, various
dualisms permeated the European, historical imagina-
tion. Within this worldview, aspects of these
dichotomies were understood to exist in fundamental
distinction from one another; that is, not only were
divisions of each dualism conceptualized as inherently
disconnected and independent, but one aspect of each
dichotomy was always understood as naturally and
intrinsically superior to the other.  Sallie McFague
argues that the primary dualism within this imagina-
tion was the conceptualization of ‘reason’ and ‘nature’
as fundamentally distinct entities, in which reason was
positioned in hierarchical relation to nature.  However,
this dichotomy has been broadened to represent, incor-
porate and interconnect with multiple other
dichotomies, including, spirit/body, male/female, rea-
son/emotion, and human/nature (McFague, 1997: 88).
According to McFague, “the [reason/nature] dualism
illuminates most of the other dualisms: whatever falls
on the top side of a dualism has connections with ‘rea-
son,’ and whatever falls on the bottom side is seen as
similar to ‘nature’” (1997: 88).  In this sense, the projec-
tion of these constructions onto seemingly-different
aspects of reality, including ‘different’ bodies, func-
tioned to hierarchically organize both European society
and the universe at large.  
It is important to recognize that because these
dualisms were constructions of a very particular and
ethnocentric group within European history, namely
elite, white men, such subjects were also imagined to
embody the superior aspects of various dichotomies; in
other words, characteristics associated with reason
were presumed to adhere to white, European males
(McFague, 1997: 88). Within this imagination, the
rational capacities and spiritual natures of white, mas-
culine and European humans were imagined to prevent
them from being confined by or to their bodies, or influ-
enced by emotional or sexual responses. Importantly,
because such racialized and gendered subjects were the
Becoming (More-than-) Human:
Ecofeminism, Dualisms and the
Erosion of the Colonial
Human Subject
by Nicole Bonner
Illustrations by Sami Abdelmalik
I argue that the concept of ๋human, ํ is not ๋natural, ํ stable or straightforward, rather
it is a culturally-specific and historical invention, one intimately implicated within con-
temporary, environmental problems.
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only subjects envisioned to embody these and other
superior dimensions of various dualisms, white,
European men were positioned as the ideal modes of
humanness within a great chain of being.  In this sense,
as the white, European masculine subject was assumed
to embody humanness, subjects who were constructed
to embody the opposing dimensions of these
dichotomies were regarded as his nonhuman Others.
Arguably, as the human was constructed to embody
whiteness, masculinity and European ancestry, his
Other may be regarded as the colonized, non-white
woman. Through her gendered, racialized and cultural
difference from the human, she was constructed to
embody characteristics he did not. According to this
dualistic relationship of interconnected difference(s),
because she embodied matter, or solely bodily exis-
tence, she possesses neither inherent consciousness nor
spirituality allowed by such consciousness.  Because she
was conceptualized as the Other to the sole, normative
human, she was categorized as nonhuman. In this
sense, it may be recognized how there has existed a sig-
nificant, conceptual connection between non-white
women and nature, as both were understood as nonhu-
man material beings in relation to the European, white
man, who was presumed to embody true humanness.
Through this ideology of the normative human subject,
women and nature are conceptually demoted to a sub-
ordinate position because of what they are assumed to
be (Primavesi, 1991: 142). However, this connection
between nature and Aboriginal women is not only ideo-
logical: because both are regarded to exist in solely
material form, and therefore to lack spiritual natures or
capacities for consciousness, various manifestations of
colonial violence against both nature and Aboriginal
women have been historically disregarded, undermined
or recognized as justified. This construction of the mas-
culine human subject as the one who alone inhabits
higher realms of reason and spirit served to legitimize
and stabilize future social and religious structures of
subordination and dominance. Women and nature have
been placed under male domination and rule by the
compelling and authoritative force of this prevailing
ideology (Primavesi, 1991: 142-147). 
Within contemporary, North American academe,
this historical, European construction of the human has
been greatly interrogated, denaturalized and critiqued
by postcolonial, critical race and psychoanalytic theo-
rists, including Frantz Fanon and Sylvia Wynter, among
many others. Within their theories, great energy is
focused on how the articulation of humanness has, and
continues to affect subjects who have been historically
excluded by this rigid definition at the level of social,
emotional, psychic and bodily realities. These theorists
are correct in their assertions that the purpose of the
human construction was to reduce the modes of being,
embodied by nonwhite and non-European/nonwestern
subjects, in order to elevate the mode of being embod-
ied by their cultural Others. However, it must be recog-
nized that there exists a subtle, but continued, hierar-
chical and dualistic relationship between human and
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nonhuman within these theories. Not only do human
beings continue to be understood as stably and inher-
ently different from nonhuman beings, principally ani-
mals, but human experiences of colonial violence, and
therefore, human modes of being, are essentially recog-
nized as more significant than the modes of being and
lived realities of more-than-human beings. In fact, as
the conflation of racialized humans with more-than-
humans is articulated as undermining the violence
experienced by such human subjects, violence against
animals and nature, in such forms as human invasion,
objectification, exploitation and voracious consump-
tion, is disregarded as violence per se. Gebara calls this
trend an anthropocentric “hierarchicalizing of knowing
[that actually] runs parallel to the hierarchicalizing of
society, [which is] itself a characteristic of the patriar-
chal world” (1999: 25). In this sense, within such criti-
cism, there is an attempt to destabilize one conception
of the boundary between human and nonhuman, while
a second human/nonhuman dualism is (re)produced
and supported; ultimately, the traditional border,
employed in colonial fantasies to distinguish what
counts as (a) human and what does not, is kept intact. 
These attempts to distinguish the human, along
with having a colonial genealogy, are built on the
assumption of a distinct sphere in which humans act,
and blind to ideas of significant interconnection and
interdependence: dimensions of each dualism are con-
sidered not only unrelated to, but to actually oppose,
one another. However, each element of social reality is
constructed in relation to others; in other words, every
aspect of each dichotomy involves a reference to that
which is supposedly opposite, distinct from, or Other
to, the primary category (See Hewitt Suchocki, 1982).
In this sense, all aspects of the dichotomies require ref-
erence beyond them in order to develop as intelligible
categories and, therefore, cannot be understood, or
even exist, outside the relationships within which they
are implicated (Hewitt Suchocki, 1982: 6—7). More
importantly, there are material interrelationships that
are not captured by these dichotomies.  As an example
we can think of contemporary environmental threats,
such as global warming and Colony Collapse Disorder
in North America, that illustrate how humans are not
ultimately separate from nature, but dependent on it
for our survival, and that ‘natural’ phenomena has the
potential to powerfully and disastrously affect humans.
In this sense, it must be recognized that there is danger
within denial: by assuming that we are not part of
nature, we ultimately deny the significance of ecological
problems on their own bodies and lived realities. 
However, I think it necessary at this point to
remark on the (neo)colonial anthropo-centrism within
many conceptions of human/nature relationality.
Similar to the consciousness of more-than-human ani-
mals, when ecological problems are recognized as prob-
lems per se, and especially, when such issues are recog-
nized to transcend the human/nature divide and create
an impact in the lives of humans, such problems tend to
be understood in human terms. In other words, nature
often becomes the subject of human attention, concern,
and care when humans acknowledge the fact that we
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are intimately related to, and ultimately dependent on,
the earth for our survival and wellbeing, and that by
abusing and destroying nature and more-than-human
subjects, humans ultimately bring about their own
destruction. Although within such types of care, the
interrelatedness among all beings within the web of life
is recognized, such care for nature often develops
because humans fear the effects of environmental dis-
asters on our lives, and not because we genuinely care
about the lives and wellbeing of Other creatures or the
earth, in and of themselves.  And even within environ-
mental concerns, the recognition of the interrelated-
ness of all living subjects often leads to a hierarchy of
environmental issues.  Within conceptions of human/
more-than-human relations, there is often a hierarchy
of environmental issues and social issues, including the
(neo)colonial treatment of humans outside the domi-
nant, white, European/western man as nonhuman,
strengthening the conceptual disconnect between these
human and more-than-human. These aspects of envi-
ronmental interrelatedness must be regarded as not
only anthropocentric, but violent, contemporary mani-
festations of the historically-dominant, European con-
struction of the normative and viable human subject. 
In this sense, it is evident that a new consciousness
must emerge. Humans must begin to recognize that, as
Paula Gunn Allen states, “we are the land… the land and
the people are the same… The earth is the source of
being of the people and we are equally the being of the
earth. The land is not really a place separate from our-
selves… The land is not a mere source of survival, dis-
tant from the creatures it nurtures” (Allen, as quoted in
Christ, 1997: 114). Christ employs the term ‘interde-
pendence’ in order to characterize the connection
between all beings in the web of life. Yet the word inter-
dependence must be used cautiously, for although
humans are dependent on nature, animals, plants and
other more-than-humans, as well as other humans for
our survival, the earth is not reciprocally dependent on
humans. In fact, the presence of (certain) humans on
the earth has historically prevented, and continues to
threaten, the flourishing and wellbeing of Others,
including both human and more-than-human beings
within the web of life. In this sense, concepts such as
interdependence undermine the reality of power rela-
tions that exist between and among different modes of
being, including human relationships and those
between humans and nature. 
For this reason, ecofeminists’ use the notion inter-
dependence to illustrate that humans are not separate
from, but intimately implicated within, the natural
world. This concept helps to demonstrate that “‘human’
beings are essentially relational and interdependent.
We are tied to [‘human’ and ‘more-than-human’]
Others from the moment of birth to the moment of
death. Our lives are dependent in more ways than we
can begin to imagine on support and nurture from the
web of life, from the earth body” (Christ, 1997: 136).
Because the interdependent relation between human
subjects and the earth is conceptualized as so intimate,
human actions can have significant, and often disas-
trous effects on nature. However, the agency and power
of nature in creating significant phenomena in the lived
realities, societies and experiences of humans must also
be recognized. This concept destabilizes colonial, west-
ern (and gendered) conceptions of the earth as a passive
object, to be owned, harnessed, excavated and harvest-
ed in order to increase the economic and social flourish-
ing of humans. In other words, the notion of interde-
pendence demonstrates that humans are also affected
by more-than-human lives, and that the earth is not a
passive, receptive instrument to be exploited by and for
human cultures. Examples such as decreased air quali-
ty and Colony Collapse Disorder illustrate the power of
the earth to violently fight back against human abuse in
order to protect itself. 
In order for a more life-affirming, harmonious rela-
tionship between the natural world and human beings
to emerge and, therefore, in order to ensure the survival
of all beings within the web of life, what ultimately
needs to emerge is a new conception of the relationship
between human and more-than-human life. McFague
proposes the notion of subject-subjects relations, which
encompasses a radical and life-affirming way of trans-
forming this hierarchical relationship. According to this
model, human subjects must relate to nature as a sub-
ject. While recognizing their own intrinsic relation to
Other subjects, grounded in their interconnection with-
in the web of life, human subjects must recognize more-
than-human subjects’ own intrinsic value and right to
live, quite apart from human interests and lives. In
other words, we must recognize the otherness of more-
than-humans, yet simultaneously feel a connection and
recognize an affinity with such subjects. This connec-
tion “underscores both radical unity and radical indi-
viduality. It suggests a different, basic sensibility for all
our knowing and doing and a different kind of know-ink
and doing… It says: ‘I am a subject and live in a world
of many other different subjects’” (McFague, 1997: 38).
According to McFague, this will involve “the loving eye
[as well as] the other senses, for it moves the eye from
the mind (and the heavens) to the body (and the earth).
It will result in an embodied kind of knowledge of other
subjects who, like ourselves, occupy specific bodies in
specific locations on this messy, muddy, wonderful,
complex, mysterious earth” (Mc Fague, 1997: 36). 
Practicing this type of relationship will implicitly
and explicitly embody a radical challenge to what it has
historically meant to be both a human and nonhuman
subject. It will require an erosion of the imagined
boundary, grounded in the perception of difference,
between human and nature, and the other, intercon-
nected dichotomies within the European, colonial, his-
torical imagination. It will also involve re-valuing the
both sides of classic western dualisms as significant and
worthy in and of themselves. This type of relationship
will necessitate the erosion of concepts such as intrinsic
inferiority and superiority, and potentially end the
embodied and lived power relations that such concepts
sanction. Perhaps most importantly, the subject-sub-
jects relationship will allow a new understanding of the
relations between all beings within the web of life to
emerge; the human, that is, the normative, white,
European man of the (neo)colonial imagination, and
the human of the human/nature dichotomy, and his
wellbeing, subjectivity, knowledge and mode of being,
will be displaced of from the dominant center.
Beginning to recognize and relate to more-than-
humans as subjects will inevitably represent a strong
challenge to the coherence of the traditional, anthro-
pocentric, colonial paradigm. The fantasy of humans as
the sole, normative subjects within the universe has his-
torically, and continues to provide powerful senses of
security and identity to many of us; we are therefore
deeply attached to this conception of humanness.
However, in order for a more life affirming, harmonious
relationship between the natural world and human
beings to emerge, we must begin to practice such mod-
els within all of our relationships, including relation-
ships with more-than-human beings and other human
subjects. Such an endeavor is crucial for the flourishing,
and ultimately, the survival of all beings within the web
of life. 
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Lauren Corman:  How have questions regarding ani-
mals and animality figured into your film scholarship?
When did you bring these themes into your work, and
why? 
Akira Mizuta Lippit: That is its own story in a way.
The book that you refer to, Electric Animal, was written
initially as my doctoral dissertation, and at the time, I
was thinking in particular about the moment at which
cinema appeared in the late 19th century. There are all
kinds of phantasmatic and imaginary birthdays of cine-
ma, but generally people agree that 1895, or there-
abouts, was when cinema appeared as a set of techno-
logical, aesthetic, and cultural features, and as an eco-
nomic mode of exchange. People sold and bought tick-
ets and attended screenings.
And I was thinking about what it must have felt like at
that moment to experience this uncanny medium.
There are various reports of early film performances
and screenings, some of them apocryphal and inventive
and embellished and so forth, but I think the fascina-
tion, the kind of wonder that cinema evoked among
many early viewers had to do with this uncanny repro-
duction of life, of living movement, and the strange ten-
sion that it created between this new technology (and
we are in the middle of the industrial revolution and
seeing the advent of all sorts of technologies and
devices and apparatuses), and its proximity to, in a sim-
ple way, life: the movements of bodies. And I began to
think that the principle of animation, here was critical.
To make something move, and in thinking about the
term animation and all of its roots, to make something
breathe, to make something live.  
What struck me, in this Frankensteinian moment was
the sense that something had come to life, and the key
seemed to be about how people understood, conceived
of, and practiced this notion of animating life through a
technology.  I started to hear a resonance between ani-
mals and animation.  I started to think about the way in
which animals also played a role, not only in early cine-
ma and in animation and the practice of the genre but
leading up to it in the famous photographs of Edward
Muybridge and Étienne-Jules Marey, the moving
images of animals that were produced serially, as well
as the “chronophotographs” that rendered animal
motion.  And it occurred to me that there was a reason
to pause and think about what role animals were play-
ing at that moment in history.  
As I began to read, and as I began to collect materials
and to think through this question of the status and
function of the animal, what animality meant, it took on
its own set of values, and essentially Electric Animal
ended up being a kind of preamble, or an introduction
to a book that I haven’t yet written, because I only
reach at the end of the book, and in a very perfunctory
manner, the advent of cinema.  So in a sense, this book,
and this question, about what an animal meant for gen-
erations before, at that moment and in successive gen-
erations, became its own subject, one I still think is crit-
ically linked to the question of cinema, and the arrival
of cinema, and the force of cinema throughout the 20th
century.  
LC: Let’s return to that piece that you mentioned about
life, and that cinema could show or play this
Frankensteinian role; of course, a parallel stream is
Electric Animal
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around death, and some of the work that I have read
about early cinema shows that people were quite afraid,
initially, of what it meant.  Could you comment on that
theme of death and the animal in cinema?
AML: This emerged as a major issue during the course
of my study.  The discourse on death and the uncanny,
the idea that something appears to be there, in the form
of a ghost or a phantom, already existed in discussions
of photography throughout the 19th century.  The sense
that photography forges a material connection to the
object, that the photograph establishes a material con-
nection to the photographed object, and as such when
you look at a photograph you are not simply looking at
a rendering, like an artist’s interpretation in a painting
or sculpture, but you are actually looking at, experienc-
ing a kind of carnal, physical contact with the persons
themselves, or with an object, reappears frequently in
the discourses on photography.  This creates a real
excitement, and also fear.  I think that effect, the photo-
graphic effect of somehow being in the presence of the
thing itself, is enhanced by the addition of movement,
because with movement you have the feeling that this
being is not just there, looking at you perhaps, but also
moving in its element, in its time, whether (and this is
very important to the discussions of photography) that
person is still alive or not. I think that gap is produced
at the moment of any photograph and perhaps in any
film: the person who appears before you, who appears
to be alive, who at that moment is alive, may or may not
still be alive.  So it produces, among those who have
thought in this way, a sense of uncanniness, something
is there and isn’t there at once.  
Where I think that this is particularly important in this
discussion of “the animal,” and as I began to discover in
doing the reading (I should add that I am not a philoso-
pher, I don’t teach philosophy, but I am a reader of phi-
losophy; I read it sporadically, I read here and there
wherever my interests are) is that with very few but
important exceptions, there is a line of western philos-
ophy that says animals are incapable of dying.  On the
most intuitive level this seems nonsensical.  Of course
animals die. We know that animals die. We kill animals;
we kill them andwe see them die.  No question that ani-
mals die.  But the philosophical axiom here—which
begins with Epicurus, but is repeated over and over, by
Descartes perhaps most forcefully, and in the 20th cen-
tury by Martin Heidegger—is that death is not simply a
perishing, the end of life, but it is a experience that one
has within life, a relationship with one’s own end.  The
claim that is made over and over again, which has been
disputed by many people – and it is certainly not my
claim – but the claim that one finds repeatedly in phi-
losophy is that animals don’t die – they don’t have
death in the way human beings have, and carry with
them, death.  Animals know fear, they know things like
instinctual preservation, they seek to survive, but they
don’t have death as an experience.  Heidegger will say
in the most callous way, they simply perish.  
It struck me that this problem was not a problem of ani-
mals, but rather a problem for human beings.  If human
beings don’t concede the capacity of animals to die,
then what does it mean that animals are disappearing at
this very moment, in the various developments of
industry, in human population, in urbanization, envi-
ronmental destruction, that animals are increasingly
disappearing from the material and everyday world?
And where do they go, if we don’t, as human beings,
concede or allow them death? (Of course this is only in
a very specific, and one might argue, very small, discur-
sive space in western philosophy.  Many people have
pointed out that this is not the case in religious dis-
courses, in a variety of cultural practices, and in various
ethnic and cultural communities.  This is a certain kind
of western ideology that has been produced through a
long history of western philosophy.)  So the question of
death, the particular form of suspended death that pho-
tography and cinema introduced appeared in response
to perhaps a crisis in western critical and philosophical
discourse that denied to the animal, to animals, the
same kind of death that human beings experience.  You
have this convergence of two death-related, life-and-
death related, problems at a time when I think that
these issues were particularly important.
LC:  So from there, the question that comes to mind is
what purpose does it serve and the word that is coming
to mind is identity, and the idea of human identity and
subjectivity.  There must be some reason that western
thought keeps going back to this denial of animal death.
You tie it in, as others have, to language.  
It struck me that this problem was not a problem of animals, but it was a
problem for human beings. If human beings don’t concede the capacity for
animals to die, then what does it mean that animals are disappearing at this
very moment, in various kinds of developments of industry, in human popula-
tion, in urbanization, environmental degradation, that animals are increasing-
ly disappearing from the material and everyday world.
AML:  Two key features of human subjectivity, in the
tradition of western philosophy, have been language
and death, and the relationship between language and
death.  This goes back to Plato, to Socrates, and before.
The point at which I was writing Electric Animal, at the
end of the 20th century, gave me the ability to look back
at developments in critical theory, philosophy, and the
history of ideas throughout the 20th century, and it
became clear with the significant interventions of the
late 1960s that from at least one century earlier, the
question of human subjectivity, its stability, its
absoluteness, had already been in question.  This ques-
tion is slowly working its way toward a radical re-evalu-
ation of the status of, the value of, and ultimately the
confidence that human beings place in their own sub-
jectivity, and there are many, many influences: around
questions of gender and sexuality, questions of race and
identity, and in crimes like  genocide, for example, dur-
ing World War II, but before and after as well.  All of
these developments contribute to this reevaluation, but
one could argue that at this moment, in the late 19th
century already, there was a certain sense that what had
been insisted upon as absolutely unique, as an absolute
form in itself – the human subject – required a whole
series of constant exclusions and negations for it to sur-
vive. 
One such exclusion is to claim as properly human, lan-
guage; what makes the human being human, is the
capacity for language, and through this capacity, the
capacity for death.  As many philosophers argue, only
human beings can name death as such, because lan-
guage gives us the capacity to names those things, not
just objects around us, but to name those things that do
not appear before us, and these would be the tradition-
al philosophical objects: love, death, fear, life, forgive-
ness, friendship, and so on.  And it will be assumed that
animals have communication, they communicate vari-
ous things within their own groups and between
groups, they signal of course, but that animals don’t
have language as such, which means they can’t name
those things that are not before them or around them.
And it is very clear that there is an effort among human
beings to maintain the survival of this precious concept
of human subjectivity, as absolutely distinct and
absolutely unique.  So you find in those long discourses
on human subjectivity, this return to questions of lan-
guage and death.  
I would suggest that at this time, with the appearance of
Charles Darwin and his theory of evolution, and with
other disruptive thinkers like Sigmund Freud and the
advent of psychoanalysis, there is a great sense of
uncertainty regarding these edifices of human subjec-
tivity, language and death.  In Electric Animal this
moment is particularly rich with such shifts and insta-
bilities, and the sense that language is not exclusive to
human beings, as many people thought, but also that
language is not as self-assured in human beings as peo-
ple thought.  Here psychoanalysis plays an important
role in indicating, at least speculatively, that we are not
as in control of the language that we use to the extent
that we would like to believe.  
LC: What are the consequences of this process in west-
ern thought, where the subject is conceived through an
exclusion or a negation of the animal?  What are the
implications for humans, and also what are the implica-
tions for animals?  I know that is a huge question.  
AML: It is a huge question; It is a very important ques-
tion.  
One could argue that the consequences of a certain
practice, let’s say, of the politics of the subject have been
disastrous, certainly for animals, but also for human
beings.  If you take one of the places where the form of
the human subject is created, it would be Descartes’
Discourse on Method, his attempt to figure out what,
when everything that can be doubted and has been
doubted, is left to form the core.  And this is his famous
quote: “Je pense donc je suis”, I think therefore I am, I
am thinking therefore I am. If you read the Discourse
on Method, this is a process of exclusion: I exclude
everything that I am not to arrive at the central core of
what I am.  The process he follows leads him to believe
that it is his consciousness, it is his presence, his self-
presence with his own consciousness that establishes
for him, beyond any doubt, his existence.  This is some-
what heretical, it is a break from theological discourses
of the soul; it represents a form of self-creation through
one’s consciousness.  
But consciousness is a very complicated thing, a very
deceptive thing, because what I believe, what I feel, is
not always exactly the way things are. Looking at a
series of important shifts that have taken place during
what we might call generally the modern period, which
extends further back than the recent past, one finds a
number of assaults on the primacy of consciousness.
Freud names one as the Copernican revolution, which
suggested that the earth was not the centre of the uni-
verse and that human beings were not at the centre of
the universe; the Darwinian revolution, which suggest-
ed that humans beings were not created apart from
other forms, all other forms of organic life, and that
human beings shared with other animate beings, organ-
ic beings a common history, a pre-history.  And Freud
(he names himself as the third of these revolutionaries),
is the one who suggested that consciousness itself is not
a given at any moment, or available at any moment, to
us as human beings.  What constitutes our sense of self,
our consciousness, is drawn from experiences that we
no longer have access to—interactions with others, the
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desires of others, the kinds of influences and wishes
that were passed into us through others, our parents,
other influential figures early in our life— and that what
we believe to be our conscious state, our wishes,
desires, dreams and so forth, are not always known to
us, and in fact can’t be known because they might be
devastating and horrifying, in some cases.  They will tell
us things about ourselves that we couldn’t properly
accept or continue to live with.  
I think that what is happening, certainly by the time
that we enter the 20th century, around this discourse of
the subject is that it is no longer holding, it is no longer
serving its original purpose; it is generating more anxi-
ety than comfort.  Key historical events, World War I,
for example, are producing enormous blows to the idea
of western progress, humanism, and Enlightenment
values, to the cultural achievements of the West—
Hegel, for example, a 19th century philosopher, is very
explicit about this—to those values that helped to shape
the world, and ultimately were supposed to have creat-
ed a better world for human beings: the Enlightenment,
the pursuit of knowledge, science, medicine, religion
and so forth. And yet, by the mid-twentieth century
many of these beliefs were exposed as illusions, espe-
cially after the advent of death camps, camps created
for the sole purpose of producing, as Heidegger himself
says, producing corpses, a factory for corpses.  It’s not a
place where people happen to die. This is an entire
apparatus designed in order to expeditiously, efficient-
ly, and economically, create corpses out of living human
beings.  Similarly, with the first use of the atomic bomb,
on Hiroshima and Nagasaki in 1945, on human beings.
This was a machine, a science, a technology, a weapon
devised for maximizing, efficiently and economically,
the destruction of human beings.  I think what this cre-
ated for many thinkers, philosophers, writers, artists,
activists, citizens around the world was a sense that in
fact what had helped to create this situation and these
catastrophic results was not a matter of totalitarian
regimes and bad politics, but something more funda-
mental: a certain belief that I have the right to destroy
or take life from others. 
And how is that achieved? By first denying that those
others are like me. So the discourse on Jews practiced
throughout Nazi Germany is in fact even more extreme
than that of the discourse on animals; in fact, as many
people have pointed out, that many Nazis were famous
for their love of animal, some were practicing vegetari-
ans; they outlawed animal experimentation. In a sense
animals were more like Aryan Germans, than Jews
were. 
You have a series here of rhetorics that allow you to cast
the enemy, the Other, at a distance from your own sub-
jectivity, and in order to achieve this you have to deny
them any form of subjectivity. Not just that they are just
culturally different, or that they engage in different
practices: They are radically and absolutely unlike me.
And I believe that as many people began to think about
this condition (Adorno has a very famous passage in
which he talks about this), it became clear that one of
the sources of this, is in fact the very ideology of the
subject, which insists on an absolute autonomy, singu-
larity, and distinct mode of existence from that which is
not the subject, not any subject, the Other.  
Adorno, in a passage he wrote in a book titled Minima
Moralia, which is a collection of aphorisms and obser-
vations he wrote during and after World War II, offers
an observation  I quote in Electric Animal.  He titles it
“People are looking at you”, and he says there is a
moment in a typical scene of hunting where a wounded
animal looks into the eyes of the hunter, or the killer as
it dies. It produces at that moment, an effect that is
undeniable:  This thing, that is alive, that I have wound-
ed and which is now dying, is looking at me.  How can I
deny that it is alive, that it is there, that it exists in the
world, with its own consciousness, its own life, its own
dreams, and desires? Adorno says the way you shake
this off is you say to yourself, “It’s only an animal.”  He
will then link that gesture to the history of racism, and
what he calls the pogrom, or genocide, against other
human beings.  You transfer this logic.  So the ability  to
say to an animal, toward an animal that you have killed,
whose death you’ve brought about, “It’s only an ani-
mal”, becomes the same logic you apply to other human
beings when you harm or kill them.  It’s a very profound
observation because it suggests that in fact there is no
line that separates the killing of animals from the killing
of human beings. And in fact already at the moment
when we kill an animal, we recognize something imme-
diately that we have to erase from our consciousness
with this phrase, “It’s only an animal.”  
LC:  It seems to me then, too, that it’s this kind of per-
petual haunting, because in that erasure, in that state-
ment, “It’s only an animal,” there’s the animal itself that
you had to assert yourself against and its living being-
ness. Do you think in that moment that he’s talking
about—because it seems like kind of a struggle, or a nar-
rative that you have to tell yourself—do you think that is
also a moment potentially of agency, or resistance, in
terms of an assertion of an animal subjectivity, or
umwelt, or however you want to describe it?
AML: Absolutely, and I think that Adorno’s phrase and
that passage in which he is writing about this scene, an
arbitrary, perhaps imaginary but typical scene of the
hunt written shortly after the end of World War II, as
well as all of Adorno’s pessimistic observations about
the state of human culture, are written in a state of deep
anguish. As he says in this very brief aphorism, we
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never believe this, even of the animal.  When we tell
ourselves, “It’s only an animal”, we in fact never believe
it.  Why?  Because we are there and we see in the pres-
ence of an Other, a life that is there.  For him it is impor-
tant that the gaze, as he says, of the wounded animal,
falls on the person who has perpetrated the crime.  You
seek to exclude it, to erase it, to dismiss it by saying that
it is only an animal, but it allows you to transfer that
very logic into the destruction of other human beings. 
Your phrase “haunting” is really important because I
think that it suggests that a phantom animal becomes
the crucial site not only for an animal rights, but for
human ethics as well.  The ability to kill another, is
something in fact we—we, human beings—never prop-
erly achieve; we never truly believe this, “It’s only an
animal” at that moment, Adorno says.  We tell ourselves
this, we insist upon it, try to protect ourselves through
this mantric repetition of a phrase, “It’s only an ani-
mal,” “It’s only an animal,” yet we never believe it.  And
as such, we are haunted by it.  I think the crisis in
human subjectivity, in discourses on the human subject
that arrive in the late 1950s, has everything to do with
this kind of haunted presence.  Human subjectivity is
now a haunted subjectivity, haunted by animals, by
everyone that has been excluded, by women, by people
of different races, different ethnicities, different sexual
preferences.  And in fact the convergence of civil rights,
critical theory, animal rights, feminism, the gay and les-
bian movements, all of these things really shape—to use
Foucault’s term—the episteme in which the primary
political focus for many philosophers and theorists
erupts in a critique of the subject. 
LC: Without getting you to offer something prescriptive
[both laugh] about where to go from here, I do, I guess,
want to ask about where to go from here. Because our
audience is sort of the average person, turning on their
car radio, or the animal rights activist, what does this
mean then for… It just seems like a huge juggernaut,
this huge weight, of Western history for people who
want to shift, or people talk about blurring the bound-
aries between humans and animals (and this, of course,
is very anxiety-provoking considering the legacy of
Western thought), where is the turn now? Or where do
you think there are potentials for (I think your phrase
is) “remembering animals”? Is that the best can we can
do? 
AML:  Again, it’s an important question in so many
ways.  There are so many things I would like to speak to
in response to that question.  I would say that I don’t
know if I am, by nature, an optimist or a pessimist.  I do
think, however, that a lot of things have been turning
away from this condition, let’s say, or a certain kind of
assumption, about the longevity of the human subject.
I think that human subjectivity practiced honestly and
ethically will continue to re-evaluate the terms of its
own existence in relationship to Others, defined in the
modern sense. And I do think that a certain ability to
exist with an Other—an Other that may not share the
same language that I speak, but certainly exists in a
world that is as valuable, authentic, legitimate, as my
own—will be the goal.  I’ll introduce a phrase by
Jacques Derrida.  Somebody asked him, what does jus-
tice mean? What would justice be? He says justice is
speaking to the Other in the language of the Other.  I
find this to be a very beautiful and very optimistic
expression.  It is not my task to exclude from my world
those that I don’t understand; but it is my responsibili-
ty, or it is the practice or task of justice, to learn the
Other’s language, which is to give the Other that capac-
ity for language, to assume that there is in the Other,
language. Language is, according to that earlier part of
our conversation, language is that which is traditional-
ly denied to the Other.  “I don’t know what you mean
when you speak”;, “women speak emotionally”; “ ani-
mals don’t have any language”; “the language that less
developed cultures speak is not as articulate or precise
as the language that I speak”, and so on and so forth. I
think this pursuit of justice, defined as Derrida does, is
very important.  
The other thing I will add is that the development of a
field that some have called, perhaps temporarily, provi-
sionally “Animal Studies”, is absolutely critical.  I think
there was a time when Animal Studies would have
meant zoology, or in a very focused and direct manner,
the pursuit of animal rights. What has been really been
exciting for me to observe in this field of animal stud-
ies—and it’s not merely a community of scholars and
academics; they are artists and performers, who engage
in expressive and creative actions, activists who are
committed politically, activists who are engaged in their
daily lives and daily practices, and also a wide range of
scholars in a variety of fields (feminists, literary schol-
ars, historians, historians of ideas, philosophers, and so
forth)—there is a certain understanding that “the ques-
tion of the animal”, as it’s been called, or “of animals” or
“of animality”, is not something that is restricted in the
end just to the well-being of animals: it affects every-
body in fact in ways that are obvious and perhaps less
obvious.  I think this kind of realization and this kind of
community, let’s say, ex-community of people, who are
in the field but also outside of their fields but in contact
with one another is another way in which, much of what
has been established can being critiqued, rethought,
unthought, reformulated, toward a viable existence for
all forms of life on this earth, and elsewhere. 
LC:  It seems to me that it’s a difficult but important
place to be, working in Animal Studies, in these diver-
gent fields. My own experience was coming from
Women’s Studies.  It’s interesting how you point to
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these different groups, marginalized groups, and I think
that one of the saddest things for me has been also that
there’s this incredible moment of optimism, and poten-
tial to be thinking about “the animal” in different ways,
(and thus us in different ways) but also in those
moments of marginalization there has been a scram-
bling, a push towards a reinforcement of that human
subject to say, “Ah, we are just like that, though.  We are
not like animals.” I think that this is very classic, in
terms of an older feminism: liberation is about inclu-
sion into a human culture that is necessarily exclusion-
ary of animals.  I think that’s still happening, that while
there’s a kind of opening up of what this question
means, “the question of the animal”, there’s also a con-
cern, my concern anyway, that a simultaneous rein-
forcement as marginalized groups fight, using lan-
guage, using the discourse of rights, etc., to become a
part of what they were always excluded from. 
AML:  That’s right.  That’s a very difficult situation that
traditionally marginalized groups have had to address.
When you have been denied very basic civil rights, for
example, one of the immediate and legitimate goals of
any movement is to make sure that one secures those
rights for one’s constituencies, for one’s members, and
at the same time to make sure that the pursuit or
achievement of that right does not reproduce the exclu-
sion of others that one was fighting against initially.
That’s why I think the role of animal rights is so impor-
tant, because the animal is perhaps the place where life
as such has been most excluded in the history of human
cultures.  And as such it is the place, perhaps, where
this rethinking has to begin.  There will be all sorts of
differences, and all sorts of different objectives and
agendas, but when this discussion is practiced rigorous-
ly and in good faith, I think ultimately it will be produc-
tive.  Remember that most of those whom we now think
of as the great thinkers were often marginalized in their
time; many endured this marginalization, ridicule, hos-
tility.  It’s part of the task, and I think one of the com-
forts we can draw in these situations is that the process
is ongoing and one makes a contribution where one
can, one engages where one can, and it continues for-
ward hopefully toward some better formulation of life
for all beings. 
LC:  Thank you very much.  I hope you can join us again
on the program sometime.  It was really a great honour,
and a great pleasure, to speak with you today.
AML:  It was a great pleasure for me today.  And I real-
ly appreciate the work you’re doing.  The questions
were just fantastic.  I enjoyed every moment of it. 
LC: Thank you so much.  Today we’ve been speaking
with Dr. Akira Mizuta Lippit.
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The first law enacted in Canada to protect existing
Aboriginal rights was section 35 of the Constitution Act,
1982.2 The first law in Canada to recognize the rights of
non-human animals as anything other than property
has yet to be enacted. The first Supreme Court of
Canada (hereafter referred to as the Court) case to
interpret section 35 was R. v. Sparrow.3 The 1990 case
confirmed an Aboriginal right of the Musqueam peo-
ples of British Columbia to fish for food, social and cer-
emonial purposes. Since this precedent-setting case,
many similar claims have been brought before the
courts by way of the fluctuating legal space created by
s.35. Many of these cases have been about establishing
rights to fish4, hunt5, and trap non-human animals
(hereafter referred to as animals). The Court has devel-
oped, and continues to develop tests to determine the
existence and scope of Aboriginal rights. These tests
primarily embody cultural, political and, to a surpris-
ingly lesser degree, legal forces. One of the principal
problems with these tests is that they privilege, through
the western philosophical lens, the interests of humans.
Animals are, at best, the resources over which owner-
ship is being contested.
The Euro-centric legal conceptualization of animals as
'resources' over which ownership can be exerted is
problematic for at least two reasons. First, the relega-
tion of animals solely to a utilitarian role is antithetical
to Indigenous-animal relationships and therefore
demonstrates one of the fundamental ways the
Canadian legal system is ill equipped to give adequate
consideration to Indigenous law. Second, failure to con-
sider animals' inherent value and agency in this context
reproduces the human-animal and culture-nature bina-
ries that are at the root of many of western Euro-centric
society's inequities. 
This paper argues that Aboriginal peoples' relationships
with animals are a necessary, integral and distinctive
part of their cultures6 and, therefore, these relation-
ships and the actors within them are entitled to the
aegis of s.35. Through the legal protection of these rela-
tionships, animals will gain significant protection as a
corollary benefit. If the Court were to protect the cultur-
al relationships between animals and Aboriginal
groups, a precondition would be acceptance of
Indigenous legal systems. Thus, this paper gives a brief
answer to the question, what are Indigenous legal sys-
tems and why are animals integral to them?
The Anishinabe (also known Ojibwe or Chippewa) are
Indigenous peoples who have historically lived in the
Great Lakes region. The Bruce Peninsula on Lake
Huron is home to the Cape Croker Indian Reserve,
where the Chippewas of Nawash First Nation live. The
people of this First Nation identify as Anishinabe. The
Anishinabek case of Nanabush v. Deer is a law among
these people and is used throughout the paper as an
example of Indigenous-animal relationships. Making
the significant assumption that s.35 has the capacity to
recognize Indigenous law, the subsequent section of the
paper asks why we should protect these relationships
and how that protection should be achieved. Finally,
the paper concludes that both the ability of s.35 to rec-
ognize Indigenous-animal relationships, and the judi-
cial and political will to grant such recognition, are
unlikely. Indigenous-animal relationships are integral
to the distinctive culture of the Anishinabek, however
the courts would be hesitant to allow such an uncertain
and potentially far-reaching right. This is not surprising
given that such a claim by both Indigenous and animal
groups would challenge the foundations upon which
the Canadian legal system is based. 
There are many sensitive issues inherent in this topic. It
should be noted the author is not of Indigenous ances-
try, but is making every effort to learn about and respect
the Indigenous legal systems discussed.  While this
paper focuses on a number of Anishinabek laws; it is
neither a complete analysis of these practices, nor one
that can be transferred, without adaptation, to other
peoples. Finally, Indigenous peoples and animal rights
and Indigenous law scholars, such as Tom Regan and
Mary Ellen Turpel-Lafond, respectively, may insist on
an abolitionist approach to animal 'use' or reject the
legitimacy of s.35 itself.7 These perspectives are worthy
and necessary. This paper positions itself amongst
these and other sources in order to reflect upon the
timely and important issue of the legal status of
Indigenous-animal relationships.
I:WHAT ARE INDIGENOUS LEGAL SYSTEMS?
The Law Commission of Canada defines a legal tradi-
tion as “a set of deeply rooted, historically conditioned
attitudes about the nature of law, the role of law in the
society and the polity, the proper organization and
operation of a legal system, and the way law is or should
be made, applied, studied, perfected and taught.”8
Creating Legal Space for Animal-
Indigenous Relationships
by Rachel Forbes
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Indigenous legal traditions fit this description. They are
living systems of beliefs and practices, and have been
recognized as such by the courts.9
Indigenous practices developed into systems of law that
have guided communities in their governance, and in
their relationships amongst their own and other cul-
tures and with the Earth.10 These laws have developed
through stories, historical events that may be viewed as
‘cases,’ and other lived experiences.  Indigenous laws
are generally non-prescriptive, non-adversarial and
non-punitive and aim to promote respect and consen-
sus, as well as close connection with the land, the
Creator, and the community. Indigenous laws are a
means through which vital knowledge of social order
within the community is transmitted, revived and
retained. After European ‘settlement’ the influence of
Indigenous laws waned. This was due in part to the
state’s policies of assimilation, relocation and enfran-
chisement.11 Despite these assaults, Indigenous legal
systems have persevered; they continue to provide
guidance to many communities, and are being revived
and re-learned in others. For example, the Nisga’a’s
legal code, Ayuuk, guides their communities and
strongly informs legislation enacted under the Nisga’a
Final Agreement, the first modern treaty in British
Columbia.12
The land and jurisdiction claims of the Wet’suwet’en
and Gitxsan Nations ultimately resulted in the Court’s
decision in Delgamuukw,13 a landmark case that estab-
lished the existence of Aboriginal title. The (over-
turned) BC Supreme Court’s statement in
Delgamuukw14 reveals two of the many challenges in
demonstrating the validity of Indigenous laws: “what
the Gitxsan and Wet’suwet’en witnesses[es] describe as
law is really a most uncertain and highly flexible set of
customs which are frequently not followed by the
Indians [sic] themselves.” The first challenge is that
many laws are not in full practice, and therefore not as
visible as they could be and once were. What the courts
fail to acknowledge, however, is that the ongoing colo-
nial project has served to stifle, extinguish and alter
these laws. The second challenge is that the kind of law
held and practiced by Indigenous peoples is quite for-
eign to most non-Indigenous people. Many Indigenous
laws have animals as central figures. In Anishinabek
traditional law, often the animals are the lawmakers15:
they develop the legal principles and have agency as law
givers. For instance, the Anishinabek case Nanabush v.
Deer, Wolf , as outlined by Burrows, is imbued with
legal principles, lessons on conduct and community
governance, as well as ‘offenses’ and penalties. It is not
a case that was adjudicated by an appointed judge in a
courtroom, but rather one that has developed over time
as a result of peoples’ relationships with the Earth and
its inhabitants. An abbreviated summary of the case
hints at these legal lessons:
Nanabush plays a trick on a deer and deliber-
ately puts the deer in a vulnerable position. In
that moment of vulnerability, Nanabush kills the
deer and then roasts its body for dinner. While
he is sleeping and waiting for the deer to be
cooked, the Wolf people come by and take the
deer. Nanabush wakes up hungry, and out of
desperation transforms into a snake and eats
the brains out of the deer head. Once full, he is
stuck inside the head and transforms back into
his original shape, but with the deer head still
stuck on. He is then chased and nearly killed by
hunters who mistake him for a real deer.
This case is set within the legal context of the
Anishinabek’s treaty with deer. In signing the treaty,
the people were reminded to respect beings in life and
death and that gifts come when beings respect each
other in interrelationships.16 Nanabush violated the
rights of the deer and his peoples’ treaty with the deer.
He violated the laws by taking things through trickery,
and by causing harm to those he owed respect. Because
his actions were not in accordance with Anishinabek
legal principles, he was punished: Nanabush lost the
thing he was so desperately searching for, and he ended
up nearly being killed.
This case establishes two lessons. The first is that, like
statutory and common law, with which Canadians are
familiar, Indigenous law does not exist in isolation.
Principles are devised based on multiple teachings, pre-
Indigenous laws are a means through which vital knowledge of social order within the community
is transmitted, revived and retained. After European ๋settlement ํ the influence of Indigenous laws
waned. This was due in part to the state ํs policies of assimilation, relocation and enfranchise-
ment.11 Despite these assaults, Indigenous legal systems have persevered; they continue to
provide guidance to many communities, and are being revived and re-learned in others.
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vious rules and the application of these rules to facts.
That there are myriad sources of Indigenous law sug-
gests that the learning of Indigenous law would require
substantial effort on the part of Canadian law-makers.17
The second is that animals hold an important place in
Indigenous law, and those relationships with animals –
and the whole ‘natural’ world – strongly inform the way
they relate to the Earth. 
II: CAN CANADIAN LAW ACCEPT INDIGENOUS
LEGAL SYSTEMS?
If there were a right recognized under s.35 concerning
the Indigenous-animal relationship, what would it look
like? Courts develop legal tests to which the facts of
each case are applied, theoretically creating a degree of
predictability as to how a matter will be judged.
Introduced in Sparrow, and more fully developed in
Van der Peet, a ‘test’ for how to assess a valid Aboriginal
right has been set out by the Court. Summarized, the
test is: “in order to be an Aboriginal right an activity
must be an element of a practice, custom or tradition
integral to the distinctive culture of the Aboriginal
group claiming the right.”18 There are ten, differently
weighted factors that a court will consider in making
this assessment.
The right being ‘tested’ in this discussion is the one
exemplified in Nanabush v. Deer: the ability of
Indigenous peoples to recognize and practice their laws,
which govern relationships, including death, with deer
and other animals. The courts have agreed that a gener-
ous, large and liberal construction should be given to
Indigenous rights in order to give full effect to the con-
stitutional recognition of the distinctiveness of
Aboriginal culture. Still, it is the courts that hold the
power to define rights as they conceive them best align-
ing with Canadian society19;  this is one way that the
Canadian state reproduces its systems of power over
Indigenous peoples.20
The application of the Aboriginal right exemplified in
Nanbush v. Deer to the Sparrow and Van der Peet tests
would likely conclude that the Anishinabek do have an
integral and distinctive relationship with animals.
However, due to the significant discretion of the Court
on a number of very subjective and politically sensitive
factors, it is uncertain that the Nanabush v. Deer case
would ‘pass’ Van der Peet’s required ten factors.21 This is
indicative of the structural restraints that s.35 impos-
es.22 The questions it asks impair its ability to capture
and respect the interrelationships inherent in
Indigenous peoples’ interactions with animals. For
example, the Court will characterize hunting or fishing
as solely subsistence, perhaps with a cultural element.
Shin Imai contends these activities mean much more:
“To many…subsistence is a means of reaffirming
Aboriginal identity by passing on traditional knowledge
to future generations. Subsistence in this sense moves
beyond mere economics, encompassing the cultural,
social and spiritual aspects for the communities.”23
Scholar Kent McNeil concludes that: “regardless of the
strengths of legal arguments in favour of Indigenous
peoples, there are limits to how far the courts […] are
willing to go to correct the injustices caused by colonial-
ism and dispossession.”24 It is often not the legal prin-
ciples that determine outcomes, but rather the extent to
which Indigenous rights can be reconciled with the his-
tory of settlement without disturbing the current eco-
nomic and political structure of the dominant culture.  
III:WHY PROTECT THE ANIMAL-INDIGENOUS
RELATIONSHIP? 
Legally protecting animal-Indigenous relationships
offers symbiotic, mutually respectful benefits for ani-
mals and for the scope of Aboriginal rights that can be
practiced. For instance, a protected relationship would
have indirect benefits for animals’ habitat and right to
life: it would necessitate protecting the means neces-
sary, such as governance of the land, for realization of
the right. This could include greater conservation meas-
ures, more contiguous habitat, enforcement of endan-
gered species laws, and, ideally, a greater awareness
and appreciation by humans of animals and their
needs. 
Critical studies scholars have developed the argument
that minority groups should not be subject to culturally
biased laws of the mainstream polity.24 Law professor
Maneesha Deckha points out that animals, despite the
central role they play in a lot of ‘cultural defences,’ have
been excluded from our ethical consideration.
Certainly, the role of animals has been absent in judicial
consideration of Aboriginal rights.26 Including animals,
Deckha argues, allows for a complete analysis of these
cultural issues and avoids many of the anthropocentric
attitudes inherent in Euro-centric legal traditions. In
Jack and Charlie27 two Coast Salish men were charged
with hunting deer out of season. They argued that they
needed to kill a deer in order to have raw meat for an
Aboriginal religious ceremony. The Court found that
killing the deer was not part of the ceremony and that
there was insufficient evidence to establish that raw
meat was required. This is a case where a more nuanced
consideration of the laws and relationships with ani-
mals would have resulted in a more just application of
the (Canadian) law and prevented the reproduction of
imperialist attitudes. 
A criticism that could be lodged against practicing these
relationships is that they conflict with the liberty and
life interests of animals.28 Theoretically, if Indigenous
laws are given the legal and political room to fully oper-
ate, a balance between the liberty of animals and the
cultural and legal rights of Indigenous peoples can be
struck.29 Indeed, Indigenous peoples’ cultural and legal
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concern for Earth is at its most rudimentary a concern
for the land, which is at the heart of the challenge to the
Canadian colonial system. If a negotiated treaty was
reached, or anti-cruelty and conservation laws were
assured in the Indigenous peoples’ self government sys-
tem, then Canadian anti-cruelty30 and conservation
laws,31 the effectiveness of which are already question-
able, could be displaced in recognition of Indigenous
governance.32
Indigenous peoples in Canada were – and are, subject
to imposed limitations – close to the environment in
ways that can seem foreign to non-Indigenous people.33
For example, some origin stories and oral histories
explain how boundaries between humans and animals
are at times absent: 
Animal-human beings like raven, coyote and
rabbit created them [humans] and other beings.
People …acted with respect toward many ani-
mals in expectation of reciprocity; or expressed
kinship or alliance with them in narratives,
songs, poems, parables, performances, rituals,
and material objects. 34
Furthering or reviving these relationships can advance
the understanding of both Indigenous legal systems
and animal rights theory. Some animal rights theorists
struggle with how to explain the cultural construction of
species difference: Indigenous relationships with ani-
mals are long standing, lived examples of a different
cultural conception of how to relate to animals and also
of an arguably healthy, minimally problematic way to
approach the debate concerning the species divide.35 
A key tenet of animal-Indigenous relationships is
respect. Shepard Krech posits that Indigenous peoples
are motivated to obtain the necessary resources and
goals in ‘proper’ ways: many believe that animals return
to the Earth to be killed, provided that hunters demon-
strate proper respect.36 This demonstrates a spiritual
connection, but there is also a concrete connection
between Indigenous peoples and animals. In providing
themselves with food and security, they ‘manage’ what
Canadian law calls ‘resources.’37 Because of the physical
nature of these activities, and their practical similarity
with modern ‘resource management,’ offering this as
‘proof’ of physical connection with animals and their
habitat may be more successful than ‘proving’ a spiritu-
al relationship. 
Finally, there are health reasons that make the
Indigenous-animal relationship is important. Many
cultures have come to depend on the nutrients they
derive from particular hunted or fished animals. For
example, nutrition and physical activity transitions
related to hunting cycles have had negative impacts on
individual and community health.38 This shows the
multidimensionality of hunting, the significance of
health, and, by extension, the need for animal
‘resources’ to be protected. 
IV: HOW SHOULD WE PROTECT THESE ABORIG-
INAL RIGHTS?
If the Anishinabek and the deer ‘win’ the constitutional
legal test (‘against’ the state) and establish a right to
protect their relationships with animals, what, other
than common law remedies,39 would follow? Below are
ideas for legal measures that could be taken from the
human or the animal perspective, or both, where bene-
fits accrue to both parties.
If animals had greater agency and legal status, their
needs as species and as individuals could have a mean-
ingful place in Canadian common and statutory law. In
Nanabush v. Deer, this would mean that the deer would
be given representation and that legal tests would need
to be developed to determine the animals’ rights and
interests. Currently the courts support the view that
animals can be treated under the law as any other inan-
imate item of property. Such a legal stance is inconsis-
tent with a rational, common-sense view of animals,40
and certainly with Anishinabek legal principles dis-
cussed herein.41 There are ongoing theoretical debates
that inform the practical questions of how animal
equality would be achieved: none of these in isolation
offers a complete solution, but combined they con-
tribute to the long term goal. 
Barsh and James Sákéj Youngblood Henderson advo-
cate an adoption of the reasoning in the Australian case
Mabo v. Queensland,42 where whole Aboriginal legal
systems were imported intact into the common law.
Some principles that Canada should be following can
also be drawn from international treaties that Canada
has or should have signed on to.43 Another way to seek
protection from the human perspective is through the
freedom of religion and conscience section of the
Charter.  Professor John Borrows constructs a full
argument for this, and cites its challenges, in Living
Law on a Living Earth: Aboriginal Religion, Law and
the Constitution.44 The strongest, but perhaps most
legally improbable, way to protect the animal-
Indigenous relationship is for Canada to recognize a
third, Indigenous order of government (in addition to
provincial and federal), where all three orders are equal
and inform one another’s laws. This way, Indigenous
laws would have the legal space to fully function and be
revived. Endowing Indigenous peoples with the right to
govern their relationships would require a great acqui-
escence of power by governments and a commitment to
the establishment and maintenance of healthy self-gov-
ernment in Indigenous communities. Louise Mandell
offers some reasons why Canada should treat
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Aboriginal people in new ways, at least one of which is
salient to the third order of government argument: 
To mend the [E]arth, which must be done, gov-
ernments must reassess the information which
the dominant culture has dismissed. Some of
that valuable information is located in the oral
histories of Aboriginal Peoples. This knowledge
will become incorporated into decisions affect-
ing the [E]arth’s landscape when Aboriginal
Peoples are equal partners in decisions affect-
ing their territories.45
V: CONCLUSION
A legal system that does not have to justify 
its existence or defend its worth is less vulner-
able to challenges.46
While it can be concluded that s.35 has offered some
legal space for Indigenous laws and practices, it is too
deeply couched in Euro-centric legal traditions and the
anthropocentric cultural assumptions that they carry.
The most effective strategy for advancing Indigenous
laws and culture, that would also endow many animals
with greater agency, and relax the culture-nature,
human-animal binaries, is the formal recognition of a
third order of government. Lisa Chartrand explains that
recognition of legal pluralism would be a mere affirma-
tion of legal systems that exist, but which are stifled:
“…this country is a multijuridical state, where the dis-
tinct laws and rules of three systems come together
within the geographic boundaries of one political terri-
tory.”47
Revitalizing Indigenous legal systems is and will be a
challenging undertaking. Indigenous communities
must reclaim, define and understand their own tradi-
tions: “The loss of culture and traditions caused by the
historic treatment of Aboriginal communities makes
this a formidable challenge for some communities.
Equally significant is the challenge for the Canadian
state to create political and legal space to accommodate
revitalized Indigenous legal traditions and Aboriginal
law-making.”48 The project of revitalizing Indigenous
legal traditions requires the commitment of resources
sufficient for the task, and transformative change to
procedural and substantive law. The operation of these
laws within, or in addition to, Canadian law would of
course cause widespread, but worthwhile controversy.
In Animal Bodies, Cultural Justice49 Deckha argues that
an ethical relationship with the animal Other must be
established in order realize cultural and animal rights.
This paper explores and demonstrates the value in find-
ing legal space where cultural pluralism and respect for
animals can give rise to the practice of Indigenous laws
and the revitalization of animal-Indigenous relation-
ships. As Borrows writes: “Anishinabek law provides
guidance about how to theorize, practice and order our
association with the [E]arth, and could do so in a way
that produces answers that are very different from
those found in other sources.”50
If animals had greater agency and legal status, their needs as species and as individuals could
have a meaningful place in Canadian common and statutory law. In Nanabush v. Deer, this would
mean that the deer would be given representation and that legal tests would need to be devel-
oped to determine the animals ํ rights and interests.
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In a testament to his ability to draw on diverse authors
and theories, Bob Torres opens the final chapter of
Making a Killing: The Political Economy of Animal
Rights with a quote from a science fiction novel, and in
so doing he successfully draws together many of the
themes of his work.  LeGuin's character Shevek hails
from a society organized by property-less relationships,
complete gender equality and communal living.  Shevek
travels to the capitalist planet Urras and finds a materi-
ally wealthy society plagued by repression, alienation
and radical inequality.  His revolutionary ideas are
quickly shot down.  For Torres, Shevek represents a
social anarchist perspective that entails a daily commit-
ment to living and embodying the principles that one
wants to see practiced in the world.
Far from beginning his academic career as an animal
rights activist, Torres, assistant professor of sociology
at St Lawrence University and co-host of the popular
Vegan Freak Radio podcast, originally studied agricul-
tural science.  It was a "dairy production" class that ini-
tially led him to think more seriously about animal
oppression, and the logistics of the commodification of
sentient beings under capitalism.  Torres was taught to
view animals as producers.  He learned how a farmer
survives in the "go big or go home" world of agribusi-
ness: by squeezing every last bit of production out of
animals for the least possible input.  Capitalism relies
on alienation between  "producers" (in this case, cows)
and their "products" (their calves, their milk, and even-
tually, their own bodies), creating a mental distance
between consumers and producers that obscures
underlying power relations and exploitation.  Torres'
experiences with production agriculture disrupted this
mental distance by revealing the process by which sen-
tient beings become "living machines" for the profit and
enjoyment of humans.
Torres situates his analysis of animal exploitation and
advocacy within broader discussions of Marxist politi-
cal economy, social ecology, social anarchism, and abo-
litionist animal rights theory.  He challenges all of his
readers, regardless of their political inclinations and
thoughts on the status of nonhuman animals, to make
connections between different forms of oppression, and
to examine the power relationships that underlie their
attitudes and consumer choices.  He implores the Left
to consider animals within broader liberation struggles
but reserves some of his most powerful critique for the
"animal rights" movement itself.  He chastises animal
advocates who fail to work in solidarity with other anti-
oppression movements and whose means are inconsis-
tent with their desired ends.
Torres maintains that if capitalism, commodification,
and property relations are inextricably linked to animal
exploitation, then working from within this paradigm is
not a recipe for effective activism.  According to Torres,
the animal rights movement in its current incarnation
as the "Animal Rights Industry" has lost sight of itself
and its long-term goals and has been co-opted to the
point where it can no longer target exploitation at its
foundation.   He argues that the movement has become
dominated by multi-million dollar organizations with
enormous operating budgets that work directly with
agribusiness in pursuit of endless welfare reforms.  He
points to the ongoing "love affair" between animal pro-
tection organizations and corporations like Whole
Foods, and argues that these alliances actually make
animal exploitation more profitable.  Despite all of the
rhetoric about "compassion", corporations' primary
responsibility is towards shareholders.  For example,
rather than encouraging concerned consumers to stop
eating animal products, Whole Foods caters to a niche
market willing to pay a premium for "happy meat".
Drawing on the abolitionist animal rights theory of
Gary Francione, Torres shows how this phenomenon
actually perpetuates animal exploitation by reinforcing
the idea that animals are property, thereby legitimating
their commodification.  As the (legal and conceptual)
property of humans, animals' subjectivity, their inter-
ests in not suffering, and the fulfillment of their natural
needs and behaviours all become secondary to the
interests of property owners.  For these reasons, welfare
reforms and anti-cruelty laws inevitably fail to protect
the interests of animals.
Having argued that we cannot buy a revolution for ani-
mals by donating to our favourite animal protection
corporation or by purchasing ever more "humane" ani-
mal products, Torres maintains that anyone can use
their own strengths and talents to bring about social
change - all that is needed is a commitment to making a
change consistent with one's own principles.  Torres
empowers his readers to seek affinity with other social
movements and to strive for fundamental societal
change that strikes at the roots of all hierarchy and
domination.  Recognizing animal exploitation as a
needless form of domination, Torres advocates vegan-
ism as a direct refusal to participate in the consump-
tion, enslavement, and subjugation of animals for
human ends.  Veganism is a daily, lived expression of
that ethical commitment, and it embodies the change
that animal rights movement seeks to implement. 
Book Review:
Making a Killing,Bob Torres
San Francisco, AK Press, 2007
Reviewed by Elizabeth Hartnett
You cannot buy the Revolution.      
You cannot make the Revolution. 
You can only be the Revolution.   
It is in your spirit, or it is nowhere.
-Shevek, in The Dispossessed,
by Ursula K. LeGuin
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